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SEARCH, SEIZURE, AND SNAPCHAT:
HOW THE FOURTH AMENDMENT FITS WITHIN THE
EVOLVING WORLD OF CIVIL E-DISCOVERY
Anna McMullen*

Historically, privacy was almost implicit, because it was hard to find
and gather information. But in the digital world, whether it’s digital
cameras or satellites or just what you click on, we need to have more
explicit rules.1
INTRODUCTION
When Thomas Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence in 1776, he spoke
of the inherent and unalienable rights due all men, among which are the preservation
of “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.”2 Inspired by these words, the Framers
envisioned a country of free, autonomous citizens, independent from government’s
unnecessary or unduly burdensome interference.3 However, Jefferson did not include
“privacy” in his list of unalienable rights.
The United States judicial system is incredibly liberal. The disclosures that civil
litigants must make during discovery are tailored not to protect a citizen’s privacy, but
to resolve the instant dispute.4 In December 2015, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) were amended.5 These amendments made minor adjustments to the timeline
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2018. BA English & History 2015, The
College of William & Mary. Thank you to my parents for always encouraging me to do
more, and especially my mom for trying to teach me to say more while writing less. Thanks
also to Snapchat, not only for inspiring this Note, but also for allowing me to document the
writing process while thoroughly annoying my friends.
1
Interview by Bill Clinton with Bill Gates, in New York, N.Y. (Sept. 23, 2013).
2
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE pmbl. (U.S. 1776).
3
See, e.g., Eric Slauter, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness, BOS. GLOBE (July 3,
2011), http://archive.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2011/07/03/life_liberty_and_the
_pursuit_of_happiness/?page=full/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20171002161055/http://archive
.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2011/07/03/life_liberty_and_the_pursuit_of_happiness
/?page=full] (presenting a history of the perception of the Declaration of Independence).
4
See Managing the EU-US Discovery Conflict, LAW360 (Oct. 8, 2008, 12:00 AM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/72082/managing-th-eu-us-discovery-conflict [https://perma
.cc/A4P8-RWPV] (discussing the liberal nature of United States civil discovery and stating
that “the broad standard also allows U.S. litigants to go on fishing expeditions, requesting
documents that may, or may not, exist”). This 2008 article raises some points that no longer
apply in the wake of the FRCP amendments discussed in this Note; however, the United States
remains incredibly liberal with respect to civil discovery. See infra Part II.
5
See generally CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS, 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 5, 9 (2015), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year
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required in discovery and slightly tweaked the forms used to make discovery requests,
but the most significant changes were made with respect to discovery of electronically stored information (ESI).6 While the FRCP have mentioned ESI since 1970,7
the rapidly digitizing world of discovery merited more specific, detailed instructions
regarding how ESI can be searched and what kinds of ESI must be produced.8
Disputes regarding these rule revisions have cropped up throughout the country,
with a few reaching federal appeals courts, but the amendments have yet to receive a
bright-line, definitive explanation. When questions arise regarding the reach and scope
of the new federal rules, litigants lack the diverse case law to make efficient determinations about their obligations. However, to adjudicate this confusion, these litigants
may refer to one of the rights deemed inherent in Jefferson’s Preamble: the protection
against unreasonable search and seizure guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.9 Using
the huge body of case law that evaluates what constitutes a “reasonable” search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment,10 a confused litigant may analyze what exactly
“reasonable” and “proportional” mean under the amended FRCP.
Though the Fourth Amendment was written long before the first computer’s
invention,11 its scope has been evaluated frequently concerning search and seizure
of electronic devices during criminal proceedings.12 Part I of this Note discusses the
Fourth Amendment, its reasonableness test, and the expansion of the “papers and effects” language in the twenty-first century.13 Part II discusses the 2015 amendments to
the FRCP regarding electronic discovery (e-discovery) and explains the changes and
their effects.14 Part III further explains the new obligations regarding ESI that litigants
must confront in a modern civil case.15 Part IV then reconciles Fourth Amendment
precedent with litigants’ unclear obligations under the amended FRCP; this Part of
-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Y75-BLLB] (explaining the changes to the rules and stating
that the “civil rules amendments are a major stride toward a better federal court system”).
6
See id. at 7–9.
7
FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment (“In 1970, Rule
34(a) was amended to include discovery of data compilations, anticipating that the use of
computerized information would increase.”).
8
Part II of this Note will delve into the changes in the Rules regarding ESI, but for a
graphical representation of the changes see Comparison of Current Federal Civil Rules and
the Proposed Amendments Effective December 1, 2015, U.S. DIST. CT. OF MD., http://www
.ncmd.uscourts.gov/sites/ncmd/files/RulesComparisonChart.pdf [https://perma.cc/YFP9-PR69]
(last visited Oct. 13, 2017) [hereinafter Comparison Chart].
9
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE pmbl. (U.S. 1776).
10
See infra Section I.A.
11
See Computer History Timeline, DATES AND EVENTS (Mar. 2015), http://www.datesand
events.org/events-timelines/07-computer-history-timeline.htm [https://perma.cc/JZC8-YZ7G].
12
See, e.g., THOMAS N. MCINNIS, THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 223–
25 (2009).
13
See infra Part I.
14
See infra Part II.
15
See infra Part III.
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the Note works through the e-discovery-specific amendments, paralleling the obligations to particular aspects of Fourth Amendment precedent, and clarifying what
is a reasonably permissible search.16 Furthermore, Part IV also explores Fourth
Amendment precedent and correlates solid warrant drafting practice to discovery
request drafting under the amended FRCP.17
Ultimately, this Note endeavors to examine a relatively new problem—a civil
litigant’s ambiguous obligations regarding discovery of his ESI—and use the Fourth
Amendment to clarify its solution.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
In his dissent from the 1928 Olmstead v. United States18 decision, Justice Brandeis
wrote that in crafting the Fourth Amendment the “makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness.”19 However, nowhere
does the United States Constitution expressly provide citizens a right to privacy.20 The
Bill of Rights reflects the Framers’ concern for protecting specific types of privacy
such as the privacy of belief, the privacy of the home against unauthorized use by soldiers, and privacy of the person and his possessions against unreasonable searches.21
Brandeis believed that with the Fourth Amendment, the Founders “conferred, as
against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men.”22 For Brandeis, any unjustifiable governmental intrusion upon an individual’s privacy, whatever the means, violated the
Fourth Amendment.23
The Fourth Amendment specifically provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
16

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
18
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
19
Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
20
See generally U.S. CONST. (never explicitly delineating a general, or broad, right to
privacy).
21
See Doug Linder, The Right of Privacy, EXPLORING CONST. LAW, http://law2.umkc
.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/rightofprivacy.html [https://perma.cc/D6YA-2LDE] (last
visited Oct. 13, 2017) (discussing various Supreme Court decisions regarding a citizen’s right
to privacy as implicated through the Bill of Rights).
22
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also MCINNIS, supra note 12,
at 224 (“The trespass doctrine [from Olmstead] can no longer be regarded as controlling”
(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) and discussing the Court’s evaluation of whether a physical trespass is required to trigger the Fourth Amendment)).
23
See Olmstead, 227 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
17
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describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.24
Brandeis’s passionate Olmstead dissent,25 and the rich body of Fourth Amendment
case law which followed, elaborate on the Framers’ plain text. This case law enumerates what actually makes a search reasonable during criminal investigations, and, in
turn, aids a contemporary civil litigant in determining the extent of his obligations
during discovery under the amended FRCP.
A. Reasonableness and Particularity
The crux of the Fourth Amendment’s protection is that any search the government conducts must be “reasonable.”26 The reasonableness requirement “preserve[s]
that degree of respect for the privacy of persons and the inviolability of their property
that existed when the [Fourth Amendment] was adopted—even if a later, less virtuous
age should become accustomed to considering all sorts of intrusion ‘reasonable.’”27
Before conducting a search, or seeking a warrant for a search, the government must
determine if the search satisfies a critical element: “that there is reasonable cause to
believe that the specific ‘things’ to be searched for . . . are located on the property
to which entry is sought.”28 This “reasonableness determination” must be decided on
a case-by-case, fact-specific basis.29 Seizure of a certain material in one setting may
be unreasonable with respect to the same material in another.30 There cannot be a
blanket warrant or request for a search, and all searches must be reasonable in the
instant case specifically.31
To execute this fact-specific inquiry about the reasonableness of a search, a
court should first employ a generalized two-step balancing test.32 This test requires
24

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
For the full Brandeis dissent, see Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 441–85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
which discusses in-depth philosophical justifications for the amendments and why the right
to privacy is intrinsic to American society.
26
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
27
Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 392 n.4 (1997) (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson,
508 U.S. 366, 380 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
28
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978). In common parlance, this “reasonable” cause is referred to as “probable cause.”
29
See id. at 564.
30
Id. (“A seizure reasonable as to one type of material in one setting may be unreasonable in a different setting or with respect to another kind of material.” (quoting Roaden v.
Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 501 (1973))).
31
See id.
32
See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979). This two-step test was first
envisioned by Justice Harlan in his concurrence to United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Harlan’s concurrence “introduced the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ idea. And within
25
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a court to balance (1) the degree to which the search infringes on an individual’s
Fourth Amendment interests against (2) the degree to which the search is needed to
promote a legitimate governmental interest.33 While this basic balancing test can be
seen throughout Fourth Amendment case law,34 some courts have refined reasonableness requirements further as applied to the facts in the instant case.35 The test can be
broken down into the following general questions:
(1) Is the search limited to the subject matter of the petition?
(2) Does the search show that the requested data or object is relevant to the
action?
(3) Does the warrant specify data with “reasonable particularity”?
(4) Does the request cover a reasonable time period with respect to the
petition?36
General orders to produce, when not limited to the production of documents or information relevant and pertinent to issues in the instant case, violate the Fourth Amendment and can force case dismissal.37
In a perfect world with no Fourth Amendment violations, every investigation
would proceed as follows: investigators, in possession of a valid warrant, search a
suspect’s property in good faith and follow the warrant’s proscriptions exactly.38 An
officer cannot search without an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing,39 and though
he may conduct a search during a warrant’s pendency,40 if he conducts the search
a decade after Katz, the Court eventually adopted . . . Harlan’s formulation.” Orin Kerr,
Answering Justice Alito’s Question: What Makes an Expectation of Privacy ‘Reasonable’?,
WASH. POST (May 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp
/2014/05/28/answering-justice-alitos-question-what-makes-an-expectation-of-privacy-rea
sonable/?utm_term=.7228bf787127 [https://perma.cc/3YBB-J9V7].
33
E.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999).
34
See, e.g., United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001); Houghton, 526 U.S. 295;
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 711 N.E.2d
108 (Mass. 1999); State v. Sprague, 824 A.2d 539 (Vt. 2003).
35
See, e.g., Custodian of Records for the Legislative Tech. Servs. Bureau v. State (In re
John Doe Proceeding), 689 N.W.2d 908, 909–10 (Wis. 2004). The specific language of the
reasonableness questions from the case have been revised in this Note to apply to Fourth
Amendment cases in general rather than the particular In re John Doe Proceeding facts.
36
See id. (taking the specific questions the court employed in its analysis and generalizing
them to apply to a broad range of facts).
37
Red Star Labs. Co. v. Pabst, 194 N.E. 734, 735 (Ill. 1935).
38
See United States v. Etchin, 614 F.3d 726, 733 (7th Cir. 2010) (“It is therefore ‘a basic
principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant
are presumptively unreasonable.’” (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980))).
39
See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37, 41 (2000).
40
Etchin, 614 F.3d at 731–32 (explaining that the police entered the premises while
another officer applied for a search warrant).
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without knowledge of an outstanding warrant, the search may be considered unreasonable.41 Certain behaviors may seem to tip the balancing test’s scales from the
outset, but courts must be careful to analyze each case under a totality of the facts
and circumstances present before making a determination about whether the search
was reasonable.42
In a reasonableness decision, courts should consider whether the warrant is
drafted with “reasonable particularity” to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.43 General
orders to produce any document obliquely associated with, pertinent to, or relevant
to the instant litigation should be considered unconstitutional.44 As Adam Gershowitz
explains in The Post-Riley Search Warrant, warrants cannot allow investigators to
“indiscriminate[ly] rummag[e] through citizens’ personal effects,”45 and a properly
drafted, reasonable warrant should “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.”46 The particularity requirement serves a purpose other than the prevention of overly general searches.47 Particularity also “assures
the individual whose property is searched . . . of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search.”48 Reasonable
particularity entails describing the items to be seized, or “that such itemization must
appear in documents incorporated by reference in the warrant and actually shown
to the person whose property is to be searched.”49
Gershowitz asserts that warrants are particularly difficult to draft with respect
to ESI.50 “In the context of computers, which house millions of pages of data,”
Gershowitz explains, “the particularity requirement should take on greater importance.
Officers cannot procure a search warrant simply to engage in a ‘general search of all
of the devices, records, files, and data.’”51 The difficulty that police officers and prosecutors face when executing proper warrants to search electronic devices52 in criminal
41

See, e.g., Moreno v. Baca, 431 F.3d 633, 639 (9th Cir. 2005).
See United States v. Macias, 658 F.3d 509, 517–18 (5th Cir. 2011).
43
See, e.g., United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
44
See id.; Red Star Labs. Co. v. Pabst, 194 N.E. 734, 735 (Ill. 1935).
45
Adam M. Gershowitz, The Post-Riley Search Warrant: Search Protocols and Particularity in Cell Phone Searches, 69 VAND. L. REV. 585, 598 (2016) (first alteration in
original) (quoting United States v. George, 975 F.2d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 1992)).
46
Id. at 597 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
47
Particularity, JUSTIA, http://www.law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-04/08
-particularity.html [https://perma.cc/ZY7C-BW2D] (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
48
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (emphasis added) (citation omitted),
abrogated on other grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
49
Particularity, supra note 47.
50
Gershowitz, supra note 45, at 613.
51
Id. (quoting United States v. Juarez, No. 12-CR-59 (RRM), 2013 WL 357570, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2013)).
52
Id. at 599 (“Because electronic data can be hidden anywhere on a computer or cell phone,
it is very hard for officers to narrow down in advance the area that should be searched. Instead,
42
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matters is similar to the problem encountered by attorneys drafting discovery requests
in the civil courts.
The digitization of business transactions coupled with the expansion of the average citizen’s personal electronic footprint has created a daunting volume of relevant
ESI that a litigant may request or produce. This sheer volume of ESI prompted the
2015 amendments to the FRCP, which attempt to facilitate more efficient searching
for a microscopic needle in an extremely large, complicated haystack.53
B. “Papers and Effects”
When the Fourth Amendment extended protection to an individual’s papers and
effects in 1791, the text needed no further explanation.54 The “papers” to which the
Framers referred were physical documents, chiefly written by hand using a quill
dipped in wet ink. After all, the Bill of Rights preceded the United States’ first ballpoint pen sale by one hundred fifty-four years,55 and the methods of data storage
commonplace today likely would have seemed fantastical to the Framers. However,
the United States Constitution “is [a document] that evolves, changes over time, and
adapts to new circumstances, without being formally amended.”56
Where an eighteenth-century American kept a physical ledger for his general
store’s inventory and transactions, a twenty-first century litigant would likely check
his point-of-sale (POS) system.57 Rather than send handwritten letters, Americans are
much more likely to send a text message, a Snapchat image, or an email.58 “Recent
years have . . . seen a complete transformation in how ordinary citizens make use of
digital technology,”59 and the Fourth Amendment, as a living document, should be
courts typically let officers search through enormous amounts of data to find the needle in
the haystack.”).
53
See id.
54
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
55
See Lily Rothman, Why the Invention of the Ballpoint Pen Was Such a Big Deal, TIME
(Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.time.com/4083274/ballpoint-pen/ [https://perma.cc/68AZ-4QXZ].
56
David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution, U. CHI. L. SCH. (2010), http://www.law.u
chicago.edu/alumni/magazine/fall10/strauss [https://perma.cc/J9NM-PH6H]. Though Strauss
discusses the Constitution, not the Bill of Rights, the same maxim holds true. The Constitution and its Amendments are “living documents” that should be interpreted to fit with
modern society. Id.
57
See generally Point of Sale (POS) System, ENTREPRENEUR, https://www.entrepreneur
.com/encyclopedia/point-of-sale-pos-system [https://perma.cc/UF7E-U9L9] (last visited Oct. 13,
2017) (explaining that a POS system is a computerized network operated by a main computer
and linked to several checkout terminals).
58
See John Coleman, Handwritten Notes Are a Rare Commodity. They’re Also More
Important than Ever, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 5, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/04/handwritten
-notes-are-a-rare-c [https://perma.cc/L29B-YKBK].
59
MICHAEL C. GIZZI & R. CRAIG CURTIS, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN FLUX: THE
ROBERTS COURT, CRIME CONTROL, AND DIGITAL PRIVACY 159 (2016).
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understood to have evolved concurrently. Michael C. Gizzi and R. Craig Curtis articulate that “[c]onfronting issues of privacy in a digital age will force fundamental
conflicts between the more conservative . . . preference for originalism as a means of
constitutional interpretation and the necessity of resolving issues” as technology continues to evolve.60 Though not without its critics, modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been forced to incorporate digital data compilations into its conception
of “papers” and digital devices into its understanding of “effects.”61
The United States v. Jones62 decision in 2012 discussed the issues courts confront
in this ever-evolving world.63 Justice Scalia wrote for the Court, which held that attaching a Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking device to a suspect’s Jeep constituted
a search.64 Scalia, ever the staunch originalist,65 relied on a traditional, property-based
approach in his analysis.66 Scalia asserted that answering the question of whether a
trespass had occurred through electronic means was unnecessary and would “lead[]
[the Court] needlessly into additional thorny problems.”67
The concurring opinions, however, delve further into issues arising from electronic privacy invasions.68 Justice Alito wrote that “[d]ramatic technological change
may lead to periods in which popular expectations [of privacy] are in flux,” and “even
if the public does not welcome the diminution of privacy that new technology entails,
they may eventually reconcile themselves to this development as inevitable.”69 Alito,
too, espouses the value of originalism,70 but has stated that when the Court has to
apply the text of the Fourth Amendment “to things like a GPS that nobody could
have dreamed of [when the Amendment was written], I think all [the Court] ha[s] is
the principle and [it] ha[s] to use [its] judgment to apply it.”71 Accordingly, in Jones,
60

Id. at 160.
See id. at 159–60.
62
565 U.S. 400 (2012).
63
Id. at 402 (stating that the issue before the Court is the constitutionality of a search for
GPS tracking records).
64
Id. at 404.
65
See Mary Wood, Scalia Defends Originalism as Best Methodology for Judging Law,
U. VA. SCH. L. (Apr. 20, 2010), http://content.law.virginia.edu/news/2010_spr/scalia.htm
[https://perma.cc/G6FZ-HKYH] (“My burden is not to show that originalism is perfect, but
that it beats the other alternatives, and that, believe me, is not difficult.”).
66
Jones, 565 U.S. at 411 (“What we apply is an 18th-century guarantee against unreasonable searches, which we believe must provide at a minimum the degree of protection it
afforded when it was adopted.”).
67
Id. at 412.
68
See id. at 413–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 418–31 (Alito, J., concurring).
69
Id. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring).
70
Matthew Walther, Sam Alito: A Civil Man, AM. SPECTATOR (Apr. 21, 2014, 4:00 PM),
https://spectator.org/58731_sam-alito-civil-man/ [https://perma.cc/2FGZ-65H8]. In response
to a question regarding the Jones opinion, Alito replied: “I start out with originalism. . . . I
do think the Constitution means something and that that meaning does not change. . . . I
would consider myself a practical originalist.” Id.
71
Id.
61
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Alito stated that “[t]he best [the Court] can do in this case is to apply existing Fourth
Amendment doctrine and to ask whether the use of GPS tracking . . . involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have anticipated.”72
Although the Fourth Amendment may not specifically contemplate the issue of
data or data storage devices, it also does not specifically discuss wrapped parcels,73
suitcases,74 or dogs,75 which have all been justifiably seized during criminal investigations. Despite the fact that the Framers could have never conceived of a modern
smartphone, criminal defendants cannot claim their phones’ seizure to be on its face
unreasonable.76 Alito’s Jones concurrence circles back to reasonableness: if a search
is reasonable under the circumstances, then the paper, flash drive, or digital file will
be considered seizable.77 Civil litigants in the throes of e-discovery should also be
aware of this maxim.
II. THE AMENDED FRCP
A. Policy Reasons for the Rules’ Amendments
When investigating potential defendants in criminal trials, investigators find and
collect evidence that prosecutors need to get a conviction. These investigations are
funded by citizens’ tax dollars, but in civil cases, the litigants must bear the costs
incurred during the case themselves. “With few exceptions, attorneys . . . [say] that
72

565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring).
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (“When the wrapped parcel
involved in this case was delivered to the private freight carrier, it was unquestioningly an
effect within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”).
74
United States v. Soriano, 482 F.2d 469, 472 (5th Cir. 1973) (“Warrantless temporary detentions of containers that officials have probable cause to believe contain contraband . . . have
been approved by the Supreme Court when demanded by the exigencies of the situation.”).
75
Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 271 (1st Cir. 2009) (“The killing of a person’s . . .
dog . . . by the government without the person’s consent is also a seizure within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.”).
76
See Jones, 565 U.S. at 405–06 (noting that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has
expanded from strictly a property-based approach to now also include the Katz standard of
whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy).
77
Id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring). “Judge Neil Gorsuch, the president’s nominee to succeed Scalia on the Court, also describes himself as an originalist,” and has applied a Scaliareminiscent analysis to Fourth Amendment cases. Amy Howe, Gorsuch and the Fourth
Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 17, 2017, 1:35 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017
/03/gorsuch-fourth-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/NC3J-MK2S]. The Court will revisit the
question of “reasonable expectation of privacy” with respect to technology in October 2017
when hearing arguments for United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (June 5, 2017). Perhaps this decision will incorporate the ideas
found in both Alito’s and Sotomayor’s Jones concurrences, and decide whether an individual
can reasonably expect privacy in his digital life.
73
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in their practice the volume of discovery is a primary factor driving the cost of litigation, and many sa[y] it [i]s the most important factor . . . .”78 Simply put, discovery
is incredibly expensive, and the exorbitant costs that litigants can incur do not exactly
fit within the FRCP’s goal of achieving the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”79
In 2010, the Duke Law Center for Judicial Studies’ Conference on Civil Litigation
recognized that the rapid growth of e-discovery had caused overall discovery costs
to balloon.80 This conference, comprised of judges, big-firm lawyers, public interest
groups, defense counsel, and plaintiffs’ attorneys, approved a package of amendments,81
which sought to promote “better case management, proportional discovery, and more
cooperation among the parties.”82 The amendments conceived during this conference
explicitly aimed to curb excessive discovery, and particularly excessive e-discovery,
in order to better facilitate the FRCP’s purported objective of inexpensive and speedy
adjudication in the courtroom.83
B. Changes to the FRCP’s Language
The most influential changes to the FRCP regarding ESI occurred in the amendments to Rules 16, 26, 34, and 37. This Section explains the substantive changes made
to the FRCP’s language, organization, and format. Part IV will analyze the obligations these amendments practically impose. Though the concept of discoverable ESI
has been incorporated into the Rules for more than forty years,84 each subsequent set
of amendments more thoroughly explains or provides for its discovery.85 The 2015
amendments continue this trajectory by more explicitly stating a litigant’s obligations
to both preserve and produce his ESI.86
78

Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, In Their Words: Attorney Views About Costs
and Procedures in Federal Civil Litigation, 2010 FED. JUD. CTR. 14 (Mar. 2010), https://
www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/CostCiv3.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8AY-6CUW].
79
FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
80
Brian Morris, Note, The 2015 Proposals to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Preparing for the Future of Discovery, 41 N. KY. L. REV. 133, 133–34 (2014).
81
See id. at 134.
82
Amii N. Castle, A Comprehensive Overview: 2015 Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 837, 837 (2016).
83
See id.; see also Daniel B. Garrie & Daniel K. Gelb, E-Discovery in Criminal Cases:
A Need for Specific Rules, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 393, 399 (2010) (discussing that “discovery costs can be determinative of a litigant’s decision to litigate or settle a case,” which
indicates that prohibitive discovery costs might unduly influence a litigant’s decision to settle
his case or pursue further judicial adjudication).
84
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment.
85
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)–(g) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment; FED. R.
CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment.
86
See Comparison Chart, supra note 8, for a visual representation of the language changes
with the old rules, new rules, and commentary about the substantive changes in separate
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1. Rule 16: Pretrial Conferences; Scheduling; Management
Section (b) of Rule 16 previously read that scheduling conferences must take
place by “telephone, mail, or other suitable means.”87 This phrase is now deleted in
order to indicate that the conference may occur by telephone or “by more sophisticated electronic means.”88 Rule 16(b)(3)(B)(iii) formerly read that a scheduling order
may provide “for disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information,”89 but
as amended, the Rule reads that the order may provide for “disclosure, discovery, or
preservation of electronically stored information.”90 This amendment, crucially, does
not revise or clarify the older Rule’s language, but rather offers a separate category
of discussion in the scheduling conference, which can dictate the proper procedure
a litigant must follow in preserving his ESI.91
2. Rule 26: Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Governing Discovery
Old Rule 26(f)(3)(F) required that disclosure and discovery of ESI be addressed
in the discovery plan, but as with Rule 16(b)(3)(B)(iii), the amendments add preservation to the list of parties’ obligations.92 Attorneys and clients must discuss factual
and legal issues in dispute, any potentially relevant ESI, and what measures should
be taken to preserve that data.93 Simply put, the amendment adds a discussion about
preserving ESI to the scheduling conference agenda that was not present in the
previous versions of the Rule.94
Though the amendments to Rules 16(b) and 26(f) impose an entirely new preservation obligation upon litigants, “[p]erhaps the most talked-about revision to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the inclusion of ‘proportional’ in the definition of
the scope of discoverable evidence.”95 Formerly, Rule 26 stated that “the court may
columns. This Note discusses only Rules 16, 26, 34, and 37, but the chart discusses other
Rules that were amended in 2015.
87
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b) (2006).
88
FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
89
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iii) (2006).
90
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iii) (emphasis added).
91
FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
92
Castle, supra note 82, at 848. These changes were made to mirror those made in the
preservation obligations of Rule 16 for continuity’s sake. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory
committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
93
Castle, supra note 82, at 848–49.
94
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(C). Further additions to Rule 26(f) add a second item to
the scheduling conference agenda: a potential court order to protect privilege under Federal
Rule of Evidence 502. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(D). This order purports to facilitate faster
adjudication, by allowing the producing party to fulfill its obligations more quickly because
it can reclaim any inadvertently disclosed privileged information. Id.
95
Castle, supra note 82, at 852.
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order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action,”
but the amended Rule deletes this language.96 The amended Rule instead states that
“[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to
any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.”97 The advisory
notes state that the “any matter relevant” language is rarely invoked, and that the new
wording suffices when attorneys are drafting discovery requests and responses.98 The
Rule further enumerates several factors which should be considered when analyzing
a request’s proportionality.99 The factors are: (1) “the importance of the issues at stake
in the action,” (2) “the amount in controversy,” (3) “the parties’ relative access to relevant information,” (4) “the parties’ resources,” (5) “the importance of the discovery
[sought] in resolving the issues,” and (6) “whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”100 The Rule further specifies that the
information may be within the scope of discovery even if it would not be admissible
at trial under the Federal Rules of Evidence.101
3. Rule 34: Producing Documents, Electronically Stored Information, and Tangible
Things, or Entering onto Land, for Inspection and Other Purposes
Through Rule 34, the new amendments impact both requesting data and responding to requests during discovery.102 Rule 34 has an entirely new addition that addresses
ESI.103 The Rule now states that “[t]he responding party may state that it will produce
copies of documents or of electronically stored information instead of permitting
inspection.”104 This addition reflects the commonplace practice of producing copies
rather than permitting inspection of ESI.105 Furthermore, Rule 34 has been amended
to require that any objections to discovery requests must state with specificity the
basis of the objection.106
96

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2006); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
98
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; see Castle,
supra note 82, at 853–54 (discussing in greater detail the reasons behind the linguistic changes
in the rules).
99
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
100
Id. The Rule does not break the proportionality factors into a list, but for purposes of
this Note, it is helpful to break the factors up, so they can be more easily discussed and
analyzed individually.
101
Id.
102
Castle, supra note 82, at 854–55.
103
See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(B).
104
Id.
105
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(B) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
106
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(C). The theme of specificity permeates the amendments, and
this change to Rule 34 parallels the changes made to Rules 16 and 26.
97
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4. Rule 37: Failure to Make Disclosures or Cooperate in Discovery; Sanctions
Rule 37(e) formerly stated that “[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, a court may
not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically
stored information lost as a result of the routine, good faith operation of an electronic
information system.”107 While the old Rule stipulated this procedure to provide ESI,
the amended Rule instead specifies how parties must preserve their electronic data.108
The additions to Rule 37(e) replace the 2006 Rule by authorizing specific measures a court may employ if information that should have been preserved is lost. The
Rule further specifies “the findings necessary to justify these measures.”109 “The
new [R]ule applies only to electronically stored information,” and “applies only
when such information is lost.”110 The following explanation and accompanying
flow chart describe Rule 37(e)’s new test to determine if the court should impose
sanctions on parties who have failed to preserve, or “spoliated,”111 any relevant
ESI.112 The Rule should be analyzed first by asking three questions113:
(1) Should the ESI have been preserved?
(2) Did the responding party fail to take reasonable steps to preserve the
lost data?
(3) Can the lost ESI not be restored or recovered?114
If all three of these questions are answered in the affirmative, then the court’s analysis
moves simultaneously to the subparts of Rule 37(e). Under Rule 37(e)(1), the court
must determine if the requesting party was prejudiced by the loss of the information.115
If the judge determines there was prejudice, he may impose penalties or measures “no
greater than necessary to cure the prejudice.”116
107

FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) (2006).
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
109
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
110
Id.
111
Margaret Koesel & Tracey Turnbull, Litigation: Sanctions for Spoliation of Evidence,
INSIDE COUNS. (July 18, 2013), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/07/18/litigation-sanc
tions-for-spoliation-of-evidence [https://perma.cc/KU4R-PNEU] (defining spoliation as “when
an individual or entity violates its duty to preserve relevant evidence”).
112
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
113
See infra text and Lost ESI Flow Chart accompanying note 121.
114
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
115
Id. The advisory committee’s note states that “[t]he rule does not place a burden of
proving or disproving prejudice on one party or the other.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(1) advisory
committee’s note to 2015 amendment. The note further stipulates that the Rule leaves judges
with the discretion to determine how best to assess prejudice on a case-by-case basis. Id.
116
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(1). The advisory committee’s note stipulates that these measures
may include forbidding the spoliating party from presenting certain evidence, or giving the
108
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Although Rule 37(e)(1)’s prejudice question occurs first chronologically, under
Rule 37(e)(2), if the responding party intentionally deprived the requesting party of
sought information, the court may impose the harshest, case-altering sanctions.117
If a responding party intended to deprive the requesting party any sought data, the
Rule 37(e)(1) prejudice question is irrelevant.118 Regardless of whether the lost ESI
prejudiced the requesting party, the intentional spoliator can be subject to the most
severe sanctions, such as an adverse inference instruction, a jury instruction that the
lost evidence should be presumed unfavorable, or even case dismissal.119 While these
case-altering sanctions are available to a judge if a party spoliates, the harsh sanctions
are not required.120 The preceding explanation can be seen more clearly in the following flow chart, which clearly breaks down the components of the new Rule 37(e).121

jury instructions to assist in its evaluation of such evidence. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(1) advisory
committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
117
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(2); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(2) advisory committee’s note
to 2015 amendment.
118
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(2).
119
Id. See infra note 121, Lost ESI Flow Chart, for a visual representation of the full Rule
37(e) analysis.
120
See, e.g., Internmatch, Inc. v. Nxtbigthing, LLC, No. 14-cv-05438-JST, 2016 WL
491483 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2016). This case demonstrates flagrant intent to deprive the requesting party of sought information and data by destroying ESI. Id. The judge still chose
not to impose the most severe sanctions available under new Rule 37(e)(2). Id.
121
Andrea D’Ambra, Lost ESI Flow Chart, Class Lecture “Preservation and Spoliation”
at William & Mary Law School (Sept. 2, 2016).
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III. PRESERVATION AND ITS CONCURRENT OBLIGATIONS
UNDER THE AMENDED FRCP
Civil litigation, unlike criminal prosecution, demands that both parties manage
their own cases, abiding by the FRCP with no other governmental interference.122
Though the Rules proscribe general discovery procedures, forms, and time tables, the
actual process of civil discovery can be categorized into different practical steps which
assist litigants in meeting their obligations under the federal rules with respect to ESI.123
The Electronic Discovery Reference Model, an affiliate of the Duke Law Center
for Judicial Studies, succinctly breaks down the practical steps of the e-discovery
process.124 Analyzing these steps alongside the FRCP that govern them makes the
assessment of Fourth Amendment applications to the Rules more concrete rather than
purely theoretical. One of the most important aspects of a litigant’s e-discovery obligations, and the one that will receive the bulk of Fourth Amendment analysis, is his
duty to preserve his ESI.125
Under the FRCP, a litigant’s obligation to preserve his data is triggered “when
the party has notice that the evidence is relevant to litigation or when a party should
have known that the evidence may be relevant to future litigation.”126 As he initiates
the suit, the plaintiff has an advantage in anticipating when litigation is imminent.127
Defendants might not so easily be able to anticipate litigation.128 Although receiving
a complaint definitively puts a defendant on notice, “there are times when a defendant will be considered on notice of likely impending litigation.”129 For example, a
122

See Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Walters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation, CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS, Jan. 2013, at 2, http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media
/microsites/files/csp/data%20pdf/csph_online2.ashx [https://perma.cc/2P3U-6GES] (providing a “Litigation Tasks” chart that describes the typical obligations that a civil litigant must
shoulder during litigation).
123
See EDRM Diagram Elements, EDRM, DUKE LAW CTR. FOR JUDICIAL STUDIES, http://
www.edrm.net/resources/diagram-elements [https://perma.cc/3GA7-LDLY] (last visited Oct. 13,
2017). This diagram provides a helpful visual representation of the steps in e-discovery that
can help attorneys navigate the tedious and detail-oriented stages necessary in proper discovery of ESI.
124
See id.
125
See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
126
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(quoting Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001)). The anticipation of actual litigation is the true barometer of whether a party must preserve his data. See
Goodman v. Praxair Servs., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 494, 510 (D. Md. 2009) (“The mere existence
of a dispute does not necessarily mean that parties should reasonably anticipate litigation or
that the duty to preserve arises.”).
127
Litigation Hold: When Is Litigation Reasonably Anticipated?, BUS. & TECH. L. GRP.,
http://www.btlg.us/News_and_Press/articles/Litigation%20Hold [https://perma.cc/6U73-UNXW]
(last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
128
Id.
129
Id.
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defendant can reasonably anticipate litigation when he receives a demand letter or
a cease and desist letter.130 Once the party has been put on notice, he must ensure that
his ESI is protected against inappropriate alteration or destruction.131
The preservation obligation generally requires the litigant to disable any autodelete protocols132 and institute a preservation system. If relevant ESI can be found
in the possession of someone other than the litigant, an attorney should also issue a
litigation hold notice to inform that data custodian of the impending litigation and of
his obligation to preserve the relevant data.133 The litigant, and any other custodian
with potentially relevant ESI, must preserve any data “regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs
of the case.”134 Part IV of this Note will be devoted to determining what exactly falls
within this scope of discovery using Fourth Amendment proscriptions.
After suit has been filed, the parties may make discovery requests.135 These requests must be stated with specificity136 and request only ESI that falls within the
appropriate scope of discovery.137 Following the requests, the parties must take on
their most strenuous obligation: the actual production of the documents.138 Production
includes identifying,139 collecting,140 processing,141 reviewing,142 analyzing,143 and,
finally, actually producing144 the requested documents. This time-consuming process
130

Id.
See EDRM Diagram Elements, supra note 123.
132
See Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 881 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1146–47 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(finding that a corporation’s failure to disable its email system’s auto-delete function constituted intentional spoliation).
133
Litigation holds are common in litigation involving a business or corporation with employees who might have access to relevant data and ESI, even though they are not parties to the
case. See Marcus R. Chatterton & Elizabeth J. Flachsbart, Navigating the Ethical Maze of
E-Discovery in Light of the Recent California Bar Ethics Opinion, 77 ALA. LAW. 109 (2016).
134
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
135
See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a).
136
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)(A).
137
See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a).
138
See EDRM Diagram Elements, supra note 123.
139
EDRM Model, EDRM, DUKE LAW CTR. FOR JUDICIAL STUDIES, http://www.edrm.net
/frameworks-and-standards/edrm-model/ [https://perma.cc/TAZ8-6427] (last visited Oct. 13,
2017) (defining “[i]dentification” as “[l]ocating potential sources of ESI [and] determining
its scope, breadth, [and] depth”).
140
Id. (defining “[c]ollection” as “[g]athering ESI for further use in the e-discovery process”).
141
Id. (defining “[p]rocessing” as “[r]educing the volume of ESI and converting it, if necessary, to forms more suitable for review [and] analysis”).
142
Id. (defining “[r]eview” as “[e]valuating ESI for relevance [and] privilege”).
143
Id. (defining “[a]nalysis” as “[e]valuating ESI for content [and] context, including key
patterns, topics, people [and] discussion”).
144
Id. (defining “[p]roduction” as “[d]elivering ESI to others in appropriate forms [and]
using appropriate delivery mechanisms”).
131
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can be expensive for clients and arduous for their attorneys.145 Consequently, attorneys may be forced to engage outside vendors to sift through voluminous data.146 In
most smaller civil litigation cases, “linear review”147 suffices to sift through data, but
the larger the quantity of data sought, the more difficult and time-consuming the data
compilation becomes.148 Clients with terabytes of data within the scope of discovery
often choose to implement a “technology-assisted review” (TAR) protocol to narrow
the data pool and find what relevant responsive data.149
Finally, after all relevant documents have been discovered and sequestered, the responding party must deliver the ESI to the requesting party.150 Absent a court order or
a stipulation to the contrary, the responding party must produce all ESI “in a form . . .
in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form.”151 Some courts
have even held that a producing party should “produce . . . electronic documents
with their metadata intact.”152 If the responding party’s ESI is searchable, the responding party is not at liberty to produce the ESI in a form that removes this feature.
This brief summary only scratches the surface of the time-consuming, laborintensive, and money-guzzling e-discovery process that could take an entire Note
to explain fully.153 The important questions this Note seeks to analyze are: (1) How
145

See Paul W. Grimm, Are We Insane? The Quest for Proportionality in the Discovery
Rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 36 REV. LITIG. 117, 120–21 (2017)
(summarizing results of various legal organizations’ surveys on federal civil discovery rules).
146
See, e.g., David Ferry, How to Choose an E-Discovery Vendor, CAL. LAW. (Sept. 2015),
http://www.callawyer.com/2015/09/how-to-choose-an-e-discovery-vendor/ [https://perma
.cc/G9QL-CW37]. Todd Stefan, Executive Vice President of SETEC Investigations, said, “[A]
lot of . . . attorneys are struggling [to review all the documents they need to]. [E-discovery
is] so much more intense than it was historically.” Id.
147
“Linear review” is “[a] [d]ocument-by-[d]ocument [m]anual [r]eview in which the
[d]ocuments are examined in a prescribed order, typically chronological order.” Maura R.
Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack, The Grossman-Cormack Glossary of Technology-Assisted
Review, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV. 85, 100 (2014).
148
See A. Clay Rankin, III, What Every Litigator Needs to Know About Using Web-Based
Electronic Document Review Services, 75 ALA. LAW. 36 (2014).
149
See Sean Grammel, Comment, Protecting Search Terms as Opinion Work Product:
Applying the Work Product Doctrine to Electronic Discovery, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2063,
2064–65, 2065 nn.4–5 & 7 (2013). Courts condone producing parties’ use of TAR. Rio Tinto
PLC v. Vale S.A., 306 F.R.D. 125, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“[I]t is now black letter law that
where the producing party wants to utilize TAR for document review, courts will permit it.”).
150
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2).
151
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(ii); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b) advisory committee’s
note to 2006 amendment. This “reasonably usable form” may require certain functions or
formatting, such as leaving an Excel workbook in its original format rather than converting
it to a PDF. See, e.g., Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640 (D. Kan. 2005).
152
See Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 652.
153
To learn more about the e-discovery cycle, see generally EDRM, http://www.edrm.net/
[https://perma.cc/U59Q-WP53] (last visited Oct. 13, 2017), an interactive website dedicated
to discussing and exploring the minutiae of the e-discovery process.
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much is too much? (2) When do these routine practices start to infringe on a litigant’s
constitutional rights? and (3) When does a request go too far? The 2015 amendments
are still relatively new, so these questions have yet to be answered precisely, but they
are still important for a lawyer to consider to best advocate for his client.
IV. USING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO CLARIFY CONFUSING DISCOVERY
OBLIGATIONS IN THE WAKE OF THE 2015 AMENDMENTS TO THE FRCP
The litigant’s obligations under the 2015 amendments have yet to be extensively
litigated.154 Therefore, parties must look elsewhere for guidance on how the amendments affect their civil e-discovery obligations. The Fourth Amendment provides
such guidance.
Before analyzing how the Fourth Amendment helps to interpret the amended
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is helpful to summarize briefly the Rules’ linguistic changes explained more fully in Part II. Rule 16 permits a judge to “provide
for disclosure, discovery, or preservation of [ESI]” in his scheduling order.155 To reiterate, perhaps the most discussed changes to the Rules occur in Rule 26.156 Rule 26’s
six proportionality factors replace the rarely used “any matter relevant” language and
attempt to narrow the scope of discovery using a concise, objective test.157 Further, although Rule 26(g) was not amended with respect to ESI, its certification requirements
extend to the ESI the litigant preserves or produces.158 The Rule states that by signing
“a discovery request, response, or objection,” an attorney attests that discovery was
done properly and in accordance with the parties’ discovery plan.159 Rule 34 requires
litigants to produce copies of any ESI “in a reasonably usable form,” or “in a form . . .
in which it is ordinarily maintained.”160 Rule 37(e) has been amended to comport
with the discovery obligations that Rules 16, 26, and 34 have added.161 Amended
Rule 37(e)’s sanctions apply only when litigants fail to meet their obligations to
preserve their relevant ESI under the rest of the Rules.162
154

There have been some cases about specific aspects of the Rules, but there has not yet
been a Supreme Court case to dictate how exactly the Rules must be implemented. Opinions
dealing with the new obligations will be discussed later in this Note. See infra Section IV.B.
155
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iii).
156
See generally Castle, supra note 82.
157
See id. at 852.
158
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g).
159
See id. If the responding party’s attorney fails to properly certify his disclosures, he
will be subject to judicial sanctions. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3).
160
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(ii). The requesting party is not necessarily entitled to
inspect either the responding party’s ESI storage systems or the relevant ESI itself. FED. R.
CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment.
161
See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
162
See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f); see also Lost ESI Flow Chart, supra note 121 (tracing the
potential sanctions available under the amended Rule).

2017]

SEARCH, SEIZURE, AND SNAPCHAT

205

These changes to the FRCP certainly affect the civil litigant’s discovery obligations, but to what extent must he change his practices developed under the old Rules?
In criminal matters, the Fourth Amendment traditionally imposes obligations upon
police officers, prosecutors, and even judges to draft paper warrants, and then conduct
the searches to properly comport with said warrants.163 However, the Fourth Amendment does not, on its face, specifically narrow its scope to criminal proceedings.164 The
Fourth Amendment merely guarantees that all citizens be “secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.”165 Civil litigators should remember the rights and
liberties granted to their clients by the Constitution, even in the civil litigation context.166 With respect to federal litigation governed by the FRCP, Fourth Amendment
protection stands.167 Therefore, the Fourth Amendment protects civil litigants from
unreasonable searches into their private life, and, particularly, their data.168
In 2014, Chad DeVeaux argued that the old civil discovery rules violated the
Fourth Amendment because they were overly intrusive and that the FRCP pleading
standard was too “modest [of an] obligation.”169 Moreover, DeVeaux argued that the
Fourth Amendment should protect against unreasonable searches, and the FRCP in
2014 simply “[did] not employ sufficient rigor to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s
reasonableness requirement.”170
DeVeaux’s article appeared before the 2015 amendments to the FRCP, and therefore before Rule 26’s new proportionality factors limited the scope of discoverable
evidence.171 DeVeaux’s article argued that the Fourth Amendment requires proper
probable cause in conducting a search, but that the FRCP do not adequately require
similar probable cause in the context of civil discovery.172 By comparing the Rules’
163

See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Id.
165
Id.
166
See Charles R. Parker, Presentation at the 34th Annual Page Keeton Civil Litigation Conference: What Every Civil Litigator Needs to Know About Criminal Law (Oct. 28–29, 2010).
167
See Chad DeVeaux, A Tale of Two Searches: Intrusive Civil Discovery Rules Violate
the Fourth Amendment, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1083, 1093 (2014) (“[Civil] [d]iscovery is the
‘coerced production of information’ . . . backed by the power of the State.” (quoting Seattle
Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35–36 (1984))).
168
But see id. at 1096 n.84, summarizing Rekeweg v. Fed. Mut. Ins. Co., 27 F.R.D. 431,
437–38 (N.D. Ind. 1961) as follows: The court found that because the “documents sought
‘were reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,’” the production
demanded did not constitute unreasonable search and seizure. This case was decided when
the “reasonably calculated” language was still part of the FRCP. When analyzing Rekeweg
today, a reader must consider if the compelled production fits within the current iteration of
the FRCP to constitute a reasonable search and seizure.
169
DeVeaux, supra note 167, at 1103.
170
Id. at 1101.
171
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
172
See DeVeaux, supra note 167, at 1104–06.
164
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new proportionality factors and the reasonableness requirements under the Fourth
Amendment, this Note argues that DeVeaux’s concerns that the Rules permit unconstitutional intrusion into an individual’s privacy have been mitigated by the 2015 amendments. Furthermore, not only do the amendments protect against Fourth Amendment
violations, but the very amendment DeVeaux argued was in danger of being controverted can, in fact, assist in dictating how far discovery obligations can infringe on the
litigant’s privacy while still maintaining constitutionality.
A. Fourth Amendment “Reasonableness and Particularity” vs. FRCP
“Reasonableness and Proportionality”
As discussed in Section I.A of this Note, a court facing a defendant’s assertion
that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated should employ a two-step balancing
test173 in determining if the search or seizure was reasonable according to a case-specific
analysis.174 The test’s two factors are: (1) the degree to which the search infringes on
the individual’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search; and (2) the
degree to which the search is needed to promote a legitimate governmental interest.175
Now recall the six proportionality factors outlined in amended Rule 26(b)(1): (1) “the
importance of the issues at stake in the action,” (2) “the amount in controversy,”
(3) “the parties’ relative access to relevant information,” (4) “the parties’ resources,”
(5) “the importance of the discovery [sought] in resolving the issues,” and (6) “whether
the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”176
Fourth Amendment case law has indicated that the general two-step test may be
expanded and adapted to a case’s particular facts.177 In In re John Doe Proceeding,178
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin asked an additional four questions to ascertain whether
a particular search was reasonable.179 A similar approach can be taken when addressing whether civil discovery sought is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The John Doe court took the facts of the case and crafted specific questions to
help ascertain search reasonableness.180 The Fourth Amendment balancing test can
be utilized to create a rubric of sorts that can apply generally to civil cases and
proposed discovery requests. First, the two-part balancing test can be broken into
173

See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 665 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
175
See id.
176
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
177
See, e.g., Custodian of Records for the Legislative Tech. Servs. Bureau v. State (In re
John Doe Proceeding), 689 N.W.2d 908 (Wis. 2004).
178
Id.
179
Id. at 909–10.
180
Id.
174
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a “Personal Element” and “Governmental Element,” respectively.181 From there, the
six proportionality factors found in amended Rule 26(b)(1) can be designated as
either “Personal,” relating to the litigants’ individual concerns; or “Governmental,”
relating to the judge’s necessary determinations about the instant action, in accordance with the reasonableness test employed in Fourth Amendment case law.182
To classify as “Personal,” the Rule 26(b)(1) proportionality factor should be related to the litigants in their individual capacities. Therefore, the following three proportionality factors can be classified as “Personal”: (1) the amount in controversy;
(2) the parties’ relative access to the information; and (3) the parties’ resources.183 The
second and third of these factors obviously fall within the “Personal” scope because
they relate directly to the parties’ abilities or resources.184 The amount in controversy
should also be considered “Personal” because it is sought by the plaintiff and would
be borne by the defendant in the case of an adverse verdict.
The Fourth Amendment balancing test’s “Governmental” factor applies less easily
to civil cases than the “Personal” element. Obviously, civil litigants have huge personal stakes in their cases, so the balancing test’s first part intuitively fits, but what
interest does the government have in resolving civil disputes? For this answer, a reader
should look to the very first rule governing the procedure of civil cases. Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 1 states that the Rules “should be construed, administered, and
employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”185 The Rules endeavor to facilitate a streamlined, cost-effective process. While the government has no stake in a particular civil
case, it has a legitimate interest in facilitating more efficient, less costly discovery.186
Therefore, although the Rule 26(b)(1) factors could technically all be classified under
the “Governmental” element of the Fourth Amendment balancing test, the true governmental interests arise when a fact-finder, namely a judge, makes decisions or determinations in civil cases that affect the course of the litigation.187
181

The following demonstrates the two-factor test broken up into my classification of
proportionality elements: Part 1 (the “Personal” Element) is the degree to which the search
infringes on the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights, and Part 2 (the “Governmental”
Element) is the degree to which the search is needed to facilitate legitimate governmental
interests.
182
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). See generally, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1978).
183
See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. These three factors match factors (2),
(3), and (4) of the those pulled from Rule 26(b)(1) and broken down into list form.
184
See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.
185
FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
186
See United States v. F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227, 240 (1958)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Simplicity and speed, when consonant with effective protection
of the interests of the parties, are touchstones for the interpretation of all the Rules . . . .”).
187
See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 594 n.13 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(discussing the trial court judge’s discretion under Rule 26).
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Considering that a judge represents the government’s influence in a civil case, the
following three proportionality factors can be classified under the “Governmental”
prong of the Fourth Amendment balancing test: (1) the importance of the issues at
stake in the action, (2) whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, and (3) the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving
the instant issue.188 All three of these factors share a commonality: the judge must
determine the value of the proposed discovery. The first of these “Governmental”
factors leaves the most to the judge’s discretion; it allows him to make a policy determination about the importance or significance the case might represent.189 The second
and third “Governmental” factors directly relate to the instant action. The second
“Governmental” factor requires the judge to consider the purpose of the Federal
Rules and determine if the proposed discovery facilitates the purpose of Rule 1.190 The
third factor is the most isolated of all three “Governmental” factors because it
focuses specifically on the case, the value of the proposed discovery, and the burden
it might impose on the litigants in the case. While this factor might seem more “Personal” than “Governmental,” if disputed, the ultimate decision would be made by a
judge, not the litigants. Therefore, it should be classified as “Governmental.”191
The John Doe court used additional questions to further flesh out the standard
Fourth Amendment balancing test in determining if a search was reasonable.192 By
breaking down the Rule 26(b)(1) proportionality factors into “Governmental” and
“Personal” elements according to the Fourth Amendment test, civil litigants can claim
that a discovery request violates their Fourth Amendment rights. In order to comport
with the Fourth Amendment, a discovery request must first be proportional under the
FRCP. If a litigant believes that a discovery request is disproportionate, he should first
specify which proportionality factor of Rule 26(b)(1) was violated. Then, he can argue that the corresponding prong of the Fourth Amendment balancing test was
similarly violated. To make his argument that the request is disproportionate he can
rely on Fourth Amendment case law which discusses that prong of the balancing test.
However, if the civil litigant cannot establish that the discovery request was disproportionate under Rule 26(b)(1), he cannot assert that the request is unconstitutional
under the Fourth Amendment.

188

See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. These three factors correspond with
my (1), (5), and (6) in the list of Rule 26(b)(1) proportionality factors.
189
See, e.g., Rio Tinto PLC v. Vale S.A., 306 F.R.D. 125, 128–29 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
(explaining, as a matter of policy, the standards by which TAR procedures should be judged).
190
See FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
191
For a concise, visual illustration of this author’s classification system, see “Rationalizing
the Fourth Amendment Reasonableness Balancing Test with Litigants’ Rule 26(b)(1) Proportionality Concerns” chart at the end of Section III.A.
192
See Custodian of Records for the Legislative Tech. Servs. Bureau v. State (In re John
Doe Proceeding), 689 N.W. 2d 908, 909–10 (Wis. 2004).
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Rationalizing the Fourth Amendment Reasonableness Balancing Test with
Litigants’ Rule 26(b)(1) Proportionality Concerns

Fourth Amendment
Balancing Test Subparts
The Personal
Element

The degree to which the
search infringes on an
individual’s Fourth
Amendment rights

The degree to which the
The
Governmental search is needed to promote a legitimate governElement
mental interest

26(b) Proportionality Factors

-

-

The amount in controversy
The parties’ relative access to
information
The parties’ resources
The importance of the issues
at stake in the action
The importance of the
proposed discovery in resolving the instant issue
Whether the burden/expense
of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit

B. Papers, Effects, and Particularity: What Is Actually Discoverable Under
the FRCP?
Another obvious parallel between the Fourth Amendment and the FRCP lies in the
“particularity” language in both the Rules and the Amendment. The Fourth Amendment particularity requirement is largely meant to protect a criminal suspect and apprise him of the limits on the investigator’s power.193 The particularity requirement
in Rule 34 has the same restrictive purpose and additionally informs the litigant how
and where to look for requested data in his digital footprint.194
Timothy Chorvat and Laura Pelanek argue that Rule 34’s particularity requirement
and the overall evolution of the FRCP are “driven in part by a need for litigation to
adapt to new technologies and uses that continue to emerge, such as social media and
cloud computing.”195 Litigants need to be put on notice regarding the specific data they
should expect to produce to satisfy their preservation obligations and avoid spoliation
sanctions.196 The 2015 FRCP amendments endeavored to preempt any ESI-related
193

See supra notes 43–49 and accompanying text.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 34.
195
Timothy J. Chorvat & Laura E. Pelanek, Electronically Stored Information in Litigation,
68 BUS. LAW. 245, 245 (2012). Though this article was written before the 2015 amendments
to the Rule, the authors’ arguments merely bolster policy justifications for the amendments.
196
See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e), supra notes 107–16 and accompanying text, and Lost ESI
194
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discovery disputes by mandating when e-discovery plans should be made.197 These
plans should ideally be addressed during the Rule 16 pretrial conference and revisited,
if necessary, at the Rule 26 scheduling conference. If parties effectively communicate
regarding potentially relevant ESI, the more efficient discovery can be later. Rule 34’s
particularity requirement, however, truly determines a litigant’s obligations with respect to what he has to preserve and how he has to produce it.198 Practically every task
in the twenty-first century can be accomplished entirely through electronic means,
which has led to the “accumulat[ion of] vast reservoirs of information that lawyers
are seeking to tap in litigation,”199 making particularity in requests essential to narrow down this sea of data to what is actually useful.
The particularity requirement protects two things: (1) the litigant’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from undue prying into his personal life and (2) the litigant’s
worries that he may accidentally spoliate because he does not understand what the
requesting party expects. For example, in Mailhoit v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc.,200 the
Plaintiff sued her employer for discrimination, seeking damages which included those
for emotional distress.201 Home Depot responded by issuing discovery requests for
“[a]ny profiles, postings or messages . . . from social network[s] . . . that reveal, refer,
or relate to any emotion, feeling, or mental state of the Plaintiff.”202 Home Depot also
requested any third-party communications that contextualized the Plaintiff’s own messages, any photos either posted by the Plaintiff or in which the Plaintiff was tagged,203
and all social networking communications related to Home Depot.204 The court held
that the majority of Home Depot’s requests were not stated with the requisite particularity demanded by Rule 34.205 In this determination, the court relied on a test for reasonable particularity that requires “the request [to] place[ ] a party upon ‘reasonable
notice of what is called for and what is not.’”206 The court recognized that social media
Flow Chart, supra note 121, to recall a litigant’s obligations with respect to preserving
his data.
197
See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 and advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; see also
supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text.
198
See FED. R. CIV. P. 34; see also supra notes 103–06 and accompanying text. The particularity requirement was not added with the 2015 amendments; however, when comparing
the Fourth Amendment to the FRCP, a discussion of Rule 34 particularity is essential.
199
Chorvat & Pelanek, supra note 195, at 245.
200
285 F.R.D. 566 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
201
Id. at 569–70.
202
Id. at 569.
203
Id. The court defined “tagging” as “the process by which a third party posts a picture and
links people in the picture to their profiles so that the picture will appear in the profile of the
person . . . tagged.” Id. at 569 n.1.
204
Id. at 569.
205
Id. at 571–72.
206
Id. at 570 (quoting Bruggeman ex rel. Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 219 F.R.D. 430, 436
(N.D. Ill. 2004)).
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site content may be subject to discovery under Rule 34, but discovering this data must
still adhere to basic discovery principles.207 The court ultimately held that only the
request aimed at posts and messages about Home Depot met the particularity requirement, because this request would have apprised a person of “ordinary intelligence”
on notice of what documents he would be expected to produce.208
Social media data is discoverable even when the user has deemed his Facebook
page “private,” and “[o]nly the uninitiated or foolish could believe that Facebook
is an online lockbox of secrets.”209 Litigants may argue that their information is only
available to a small group of designated friends, but courts “consistently reject this
argument.”210 If a litigant is truly concerned about his privacy, he may seek a protective order from the court.211 However, generalized and unspecified boilerplate requests
for all social media posts from a certain time period cannot satisfy Rule 34 particularity because the requests are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.212 In fact, permitting the requesting party blanket access to the
responding party’s entire social media account is “[o]ne of the most intrusive methods
of discovery.”213 A court would not grant a warrant to seize anything in a criminal defendant’s office merely because a single file might be housed there.214 Neither should
a court allow such an intrusive discovery request to stand.
Justice Alito’s Jones concurrence215 states that a search is reasonably particular,
and therefore lawful, when the search involves a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would have anticipated.216 In Mailhoit, the court found that a discovery
request satisfied Rule 34 particularity when that request was reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.217 Though the two definitions of
207

Id.; see also Chorvat & Pelanek, supra note 195, at 247 (“[A]lthough social media
provides a novel context, basic discovery principles apply.” (citation omitted)).
208
Mailhoit, 285 F.R.D. at 571–73.
209
Chorvat & Pelanek, supra note 195, at 248 (internal citations omitted). Chorvat
and Pelanek further explain that “Facebook’s foremost purpose is to ‘help you connect and
share . . . .’” and therefore cannot be unilaterally excluded from discovery on the basis of
privacy. Id. (internal citations omitted).
210
Margaret DiBianca, Discovery and Preservation of Social Media Evidence, AM. BAR
ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2014/01/02_dibianca.html [https://perma
.cc/F42P-SUX9] (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
211
See Chorvat & Pelanek, supra note 195, at 247 (citation omitted).
212
Mailhoit, 285 F.R.D. at 571.
213
DiBianca, supra note 210.
214
See, e.g., id. DiBianca analogizes granting access to an entire social media account to
granting access to any of a civil litigant’s files in his office. Id. This Note adopts her analogy
to fit within the Fourth Amendment context.
215
See supra notes 62–72 and accompanying text for further discussion of United States
v. Jones.
216
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
217
285 F.R.D. at 570–71.
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particularity differ slightly, they both implicate a fact-specific analysis to determine
if the search or request is reasonably particular in the instant case.
C. Properly Drafted Search Warrants and Constitutional Discovery Requests
In order to comport with the Rules of Civil Procedure, a discovery request must
first be constitutional.218 One way that a litigant and his attorney can be sure that a request does not violate the reasonableness, proportionality, and particularity requirements demanded under the FRCP is to look at properly drafted search warrants that
do not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Establishing a reasonable search for Fourth Amendment purposes first requires
there to be probable cause greater than a bare suspicion.219 This probable cause may
be established in a variety of ways, and need not show proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.220 The probable cause requirement resembles the relevance requirement in
Rule 26(b)(1)—just as an officer must have probable cause to search or seize a suspect’s possessions, a civil litigator must have a reasonable belief that the requested
discovery is relevant to either party’s claim or defense.221
After establishing probable cause, the search warrant must be drafted to particularly describe “the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.”222 For
example, the Ohio Police Department has published detailed instructions for filing
a proper search warrant as well as examples of properly drafted warrants.223 First the
warrant must “FULLY describe the person, place, or thing to be searched, and give its
EXACT location.”224 The Ohio Police Department provides two helpful examples for
this Note’s purposes: a warrant for a cell phone and a warrant for electronic media.225
218

See, e.g., Red Star Labs. Co. v. Pabst, 194 N.E. 734, 735 (Ill. 1935) (finding document
production order unconstitutional because it was too general and not limited to documents
relevant to the case). See generally, e.g., DeVeaux, supra note 167 (arguing, in part, that even
in the context of civil litigation, document production orders must survive constitutional
scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment).
219
Sara J. Berman, Search Warrants and Probable Cause, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com
/legal-encyclopedia/search-warrants-and-probable-cause.html [https://perma.cc/X573-SQ6R]
(last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
220
Id. Berman gives six examples including testimony from the victim of a crime relating
to the search, testimony from the witness of a crime related to the search, and testimony from
another police officer.
221
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
222
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
223
Ohio Search Warrant Examples, OHIO POLICE DEP’T, http://www.ohiopd.com/search
Warrant.php [https://perma.cc/2RM7-47WU] (last visited Oct. 13, 2017). Though these examples are meant to be instructive for Ohio cases, they comport with Fourth Amendment requirements and help conceptualize general benchmarks a warrant must meet.
224
Id.
225
Cell Phone Search Warrant Example, OHIO POLICE DEP’T, http://ohiopd.com/search
Warrant/cellphoneSearchWarrant.html [https://perma.cc/783A-SNLT] (last visited Oct. 13,
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The cell phone search warrant stipulates the phone’s brand, color, serial number, and
owner.226 The electronic media warrant specifically names gaming systems, games,
controllers, media for the gaming systems, memory devices, and any other storage
media.227 These examples are crafted with such detail as to fully guarantee that any
seizure associated therewith comports with the Fourth Amendment.228
Rule 34 similarly requires that any discovery request for ESI describe with reasonable particularity each item to be inspected; a reasonable time, place, and manner
for the inspection; and the form or forms in which ESI is to be produced.229 In order to
fully guarantee that the discovery requests will unquestioningly put the producing party
on notice to preserve all desired ESI, the litigator should draft his requests with as much
specificity as possible. If a request is drafted with sufficient particularity and endeavors
to discover admissible evidence, it complies with the FRCP and the Constitution.230
If a discovery request has been properly drafted, the responding party will likely
have to follow through with his preservation and production obligations without claiming a Fourth Amendment violation. The responding litigant may, of course, object to
any of the discovery requests, but those objections must satisfy the amended Rule 34
specificity requirements.231 Any objection must state “the grounds for objecting to
the request,”232 and must state “whether any responsive materials are being withheld
on the basis of that objection.”233 Here the litigant can turn to the Fourth Amendment
Rule 26(b) test discussed in Part II of this Note.234 If he believes that a request is disproportionate to the instant dispute, he should immediately object to the request. However, the objecting litigant must take heed of Rule 34’s specificity requirement, or else
2017); Search Warrant for Electronic Media, OHIO POLICE DEP’T, http://ohiopd.com/search
Warrant/mediaSearchWarrant.html [https://perma.cc/554P-F4ZG] (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
226
Cell Phone Search Warrant Example, supra note 225.
227
Id.
228
That is to say, the warrants require enough facts and observations to satisfy probable
cause. Ohio Search Warrants Examples, supra note 223. The warrants also require a full
description of the property to be seized and its connection to the crimes, id., likely satisfying
the Fourth Amendment’s Particularity Requirement. See Gershowitz, supra note 45, at 590,
597–600 (discussing the particularity requirement).
229
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)(A)–(C). Note that where the Fourth Amendment particularity
requirement leads to the seizure of physical property, Rule 34 requests must describe the data
that the requesting party wants to inspect or how it would prefer copies of the requested data
provided. The Fourth Amendment ultimately deprives a suspect of his property where the
FRCP merely give the requesting party access to the sought data. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)
(outlining data and documents a party may discover); see also Ohio Search Warrant Examples, supra note 223 (outlining the information required for seizure of property).
230
See supra note 195 and accompanying text; see also Mailhoit v. Home Depot U.S.A.,
Inc., 285 F.R.D. 566, 570 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (discussing Rule 34 “reasonable particularity”).
231
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(B).
232
Id.
233
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(C).
234
See supra Part II.
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his attorney can face sanctions pursuant to FRCP 26(g).235 The litigant cannot simply
state that a request is overbroad and “unduly burdensome,”236 because the court will
consider him to have waived any legitimate objection that he could have.237 Potential
objections could be that the request is beyond the scope of discovery,238 that the requested ESI is outside the responding party’s possession, custody, or control,239 or,
with specificity, why the request is unduly burdensome.240
New Rule 37(e) substantiates the importance of fulfilling discovery obligations.
As long as the requesting party meets all of its obligations with respect to drafting the
discovery request, the responding party should be on notice that he must preserve and
eventually produce the ESI sought.241 Just as a criminal suspect can face jail time for
losing or purposefully destroying evidence described in a search warrant,242 Rule 37(e)
protects the legitimacy of the discovery request process by threatening case-ending
sanctions on misbehaving responding parties.243
As an application of the preceding arguments,244 consider the following hypothetical. A female employee, Marsha Wythe, alleges that her employer, ABC, Inc., discriminatorily terminated her due to her gender.245 ABC is incorporated in Delaware,
has its principal place of business in New York, and has offices in multiple states, including Williamsburg, Virginia, where Wythe was employed. Wythe seeks $100,000
in damages and brings her case in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia.246
ABC contends that Wythe was fired, not because of her gender, but because she
was an unreliable employee who, among other infractions, used her cell phone at work
despite a supervisor’s repeated requests that she stop. ABC’s Williamsburg office manager frequently caught Wythe sending Snapchats via her cell phone’s application247
235

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g) (stipulating that, by submitting a discovery objection, the lawyer
certifies that the objection is consistent with the Rules, including Rule 34); see, e.g., Mancia
v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354 (D. Md. 2008).
236
Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 358–60 (citations omitted).
237
Id. at 358–59, 364.
238
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). This objection could also be phrased as “unreasonable.” See id.
239
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b).
240
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
241
See Mailhoit v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 285 F.R.D. 566, 570 (C.D. Cal. 2012)
(stating that the test for Rule 34 “reasonable particularity” asks whether a discovery request
reasonably places a party on notice of what documentation is required).
242
See, e.g., Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2194 (2016) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (“This Court has never cast doubt on the States’ ability to impose criminal penalties for obstructing a search authorized by a lawfully obtained warrant.”).
243
See supra notes 117–21 and accompanying text.
244
See supra Part IV.
245
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
246
This suit is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). Assume Wythe is domiciled
in the Commonwealth of Virginia, so the parties are diverse for jurisdictional purposes.
247
See generally Agnieszka McPeak, Social Data Discovery and Proportional Privacy,
65 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 61, 64 (2016) (briefly explaining the Snapchat application).
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while she was at work. Accordingly, ABC’s counsel begins drafting discovery requests for Wythe’s Snapchat data to justify her termination.248
Snapchat, though known for its “ephemeral content,” stores “account content despite claims that messages completely disappear.”249 Snapchat allows users to access
some data in the application itself,250 but the platform also permits users to request
and download more complete account data through the company’s website.251 Among
the data the user can request for download is that user’s Snapchat history, which details the date, time, and recipient of all outgoing “Snaps.”252
If ABC wants to receive Wythe’s Snapchat history during discovery, it must carefully craft its request to describe the requested history with reasonable particularity.253
ABC’s request, like a properly executed warrant, should include enough detail to indicate explicitly the information that Wythe should disclose.254 ABC cannot request
Wythe’s entire Snapchat history indiscriminately,255 but requesting only the Snapchat
history during the dates of Wythe’s employment complies with the proportionality requirements of Rule 26(b).256 Wythe could not object to an appropriately narrow discovery request because such a request would satisfy the Fourth Amendment reasonableness
requirement. Simply filling out an online request would not infringe on Wythe’s Fourth
Amendment right to be free from “unreasonable search[ ] and seizure[ ],”257 because
the requested data would be directly correlative to ABC’s defense.258 Pursuant to this
248

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense . . . .”).
249
McPeak, supra note 247, at 64.
250
See Accessing Your Snapchat Data, SNAPCHAT, https://support.snapchat.com/en-US
/a/download-my-data [https://perma.cc/XGC8-G6K5] (last visited Oct. 13, 2017) (stating that
the application stores information provided when the user creates the account, such as a
username, profile picture, email address, and selected privacy settings).
251
A user can access this data by visiting https://accounts.snapchat.com and logging in
with his user credentials. Once the user requests his data, he receives a file via email containing
his account history and information, “snap count,” and advertisement engagement history,
among other data categories.
252
Accessing Your Snapchat Data, supra note 250; see also Here’s How You Can Download Every Piece of Your Snapchat History, ZMONLINE (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.zmon
line.com/random-stuff/heres-how-you-can-download-every-piece-of-your-snapchat-history/
[https://perma.cc/2UFC-DC6C].
253
FED. R. CIV. P. 34.
254
See supra notes 223–28 and accompanying text.
255
See, e.g., Mailhoit v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 285 F.R.D. 566, 569 (C.D. Cal. 2012)
(evaluating overly broad requests for social media data).
256
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b).
257
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see supra notes 181–92 and accompanying text. ABC’s request would not offend the “Personal Element” of the reasonableness test because it would
not constitute a major personal burden on Wythe.
258
See U.S. CONST. amend IV; see also supra notes 181–92 and accompanying text. ABC’s
request would also comply with the “Governmental Element” because it relates directly to
resolving the instant issue.
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request, Wythe would be expected to request her data from Snapchat and to disclose
only her Snapchat history from during her employment. Wythe would not be compelled to disclose her history from before or after her employment.
Requesting Snapchat data illustrates a particularly interesting situation in modern
e-discovery,259 but modern technology presents innumerable scenarios where data
privacy and Fourth Amendment concerns might collide.260 As Americans’ digital footprints continue to grow, the scope of discoverable ESI will expand in tandem. Lawmakers must continue to innovate and clarify what is—and what is not—discoverable.261
Although technology, and the rules governing e-discovery, may be in constant flux,
civil litigants can take comfort in having a constant source of protection from unreasonable intrusion into their data: the Fourth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Justice Brandeis’s plea for privacy in his Olmstead dissent is important to recall
before concluding. By writing the Bill of Rights—including the Fourth Amendment—
the Framers “undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness,”262
originally espoused in Jefferson’s preamble to the Declaration of Independence.263
The Framers “sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations,” and by conferring upon these Americans the right to be
free from unreasonable search and seizure, Brandeis believed the Fourth Amendment
accomplished this goal.264 Brandeis also wrote, however, that this ideological freedom came from the “satisfactions of life . . . found in material things.”265 Civil ediscovery requests digital, not material, things. How then can Marsha Wythe protect
her Snapchat data through the same “right to be let alone” that Brandeis praised?266
In the last 226 years, the very concept of individual privacy has revolutionized.
High schoolers send each other text messages rather than pass notes in class; interviews
259

Requesting Snapchat data presents an interesting conundrum because, even though the
platform primarily functions to share images, the recipient of a request for Snapchat data
would not necessarily be subject to Rule 37(e) sanctions for failing to disclose the images
that corresponded to the time frame of the request. See supra notes 107–21 and accompanying text. Unless the user had stored his Snaps in his “Memories,” and then deleted them
upon receipt of a discovery request, he would not be subject to Rule 37(e) spoliation sanctions.
See id.; see also McPeak, supra note 247, at 64 (explaining briefly the “Memories” feature).
260
See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), cert granted, 137
S. Ct. 2211 (June 5, 2017).
261
See supra Section II.A.
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Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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can be conducted over Skype rather than in person;267 and the number of Americans
who own a smartphone now outstrips the number of those who do not.268 Americans
need protection in different areas now, and courts’ conceptions of the Fourth Amendment have evolved to meet that need.269
Federal civil discovery is governed by the FRCP, and therefore any obligations
or disclosures the FRCP compel must first comply with the Fourth Amendment.270
The 2015 amendments to these Rules took a big step in clarifying expectations regarding e-discovery by facilitating more open communication between the parties,271
by providing more detailed framework for data within the scope of discovery,272 and
by emphasizing how important it is for a litigant to preserve his data properly.273 But
any change, regardless of intent, comes with concurrent confusion, and the FRCP’s
amendments are no exception. However, since the Fourth Amendment protects against
unreasonable intrusion by the government, there is no better place to look for guidance than jurisprudence regarding the Amendment’s reach.
Fourth Amendment case law and corresponding search warrant procedure can
assist both litigants and courts in civil cases. The Amendment can help civil litigants
and their attorneys determine what might be considered reasonable in the instant action, and can inform courts about how best to analyze the reasonableness of a certain
disputed request. Just as the seizure of a certain item might be appropriate in one setting and inappropriate in another, a certain discovery request might be satisfactory
for one case, but completely outside discovery’s scope in the next. Courts evaluating
appropriateness of discovery request objections can learn from courts that have determined search and seizure appropriateness after Fourth Amendment challenges.274
Civil litigants should always be aware that they have the right to be let alone
when ESI requested from them is disproportionate. A multimillion-dollar suit against
a large corporation with thousands of employees might merit the expensive and
time-consuming implementation of a TAR system, but a straightforward breach of
267

See Karl Rooke, An Increase in Skype Interviews, LINKEDIN (Feb. 7, 2015), https://
linkedin.com/pulse/increase-skype-interviews-karl-rooke [https://perma.cc/2BNV-R4US].
268
Nick Mediati, Pew Survey Shows 68 Percent of US Adults Now Own a Smartphone,
PCWORLD (Nov. 1, 2015, 1:49 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2999631/phones
/pew-survey-shows-68-percent-of-americans-now-own-a-smartphone.html [https://perma.cc
/U9XR-XSN6].
269
See supra Section I.B; see also, e.g., Gershowitz, supra note 45, at 587–88 (discussing
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), in which the United States Supreme Court held
warrantless searches of cell phones unconstitutional).
270
See DeVeaux, supra note 167, at 1092 (“Civil [d]ocument [p]roduction [o]rders
[c]onstitute ‘[s]earches’ [w]ithin the [m]eaning of the Fourth Amendment[.]”).
271
See supra Sections II.B.1–2.
272
See Castle, supra note 82, at 851–55 (discussing, in part, changes to Rule 26 and
Rule 34 and consequent changes to the scope of discovery).
273
See id. at 840–43 (discussing changes to Rule 37 preservation duties).
274
See supra Part I.
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contract claim with diversity jurisdiction probably should not. Even though the 2015
FRCP amendments made huge strides in clarifying and narrowing appropriate ediscovery obligations, the civil litigant must always remember that his right “against
unreasonable searches and seizures . . . shall not be violated,”275 and that he can
resort to the Fourth Amendment when he encounters an unknown or unlitigated ediscovery issue.
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U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

